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ARGUMENT
I.

RESPONDENT HAS MET HIS BURDEN TO MARSHALL THE
EVIDENCE WHERE REQUIRED TO DO SO AND IS NOT REQUIRED
TO DO SO WHERE THE FINDINGS ARE LEGALLY INADEQUATE
Petitioner argues that the trial court's ruling must be affirmed because

respondent has not marshaled the evidence in favor of the trial court's findings and
then demonstrated that the evidence is insufficient to support the findings.
Petitioner misapprehends respondent's contention regarding the bulk of the
trial court's findings. With the exception of the trial court's Finding of Fact No.
19, that "[n]o persuasive evidence was presented to the Court that the Petitioner is
underemployed," which respondent argues is not supported by the evidence,
respondent's contention is that the trial court's findings are legally inadequate to
support its custody and alimony awards.
A.

Findings Pertaining to Custody

This court has stated that '"[t]rial courts are given broad discretion in
making child custody awards.'" Barnes v. Barnes, 857 P.2d 257, 259 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993) (quoting Sukin v. Sukin, 842 P.2d 922, 923 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)).
However, in order for this court to ensure that the trial court acted within its broad
discretion, '"the facts and reasons for the court's decision must be set forth in
appropriate findings and conclusions.'" Id. (quoting Sukin, 842 P.2d at 924).

1

On review, the appellate court's threshold consideration "is whether the trial
court's findings are adequate to support its custody award." Id. (citing Roberts v.
Roberts, 835 P.2d 193, 195 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)). "If the findings are legally
inadequate the exercise of marshalling the evidence in support of the findings
becomes futile and the appellant is under no obligation to marshall." Id. (citing
Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474, 477 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)).
In this case, the trial court concluded that sole physical custody of the
parties' minor child should be awarded to petitioner. In support of that conclusion
- as opposed to the conclusion that the parties should not share joint physical
custody of the child - the trial court made only one finding, namely, Finding of
Fact 16.a., in which the trial court stated: "consistency of care provider
arrangements is an important issue in this child's life. Surrogate care has been and
continues to be provided by the child's maternal grandmother, which whom
Petitioner and the minor child live, at the rate of some twelve (12) hours per week.
If Respondent were granted primary custody of the minor child, the fact that he
works forty (40) hours per week would require him to obtain considerably more
surrogate care" (R.577).
For the reasons stated in respondent's opening brief, this finding is
inadequate, as a matter of law, to support the trial court's conclusion that sole
custody of the parties' child should be awarded to petitioner.
2

Finding of Fact 16.a. conflicts with the conclusions set forth in both of the
custody e valuators' reports submitted to the court, which the court explicitly
u

acknowledge[d] and agree[d] with" (R.578, f 16.b.L). Therefore, to the extent

the trial court incorporates the custody evaluation reports' findings and
conclusions, the findings as a whole lack internal consistency and do not
"demonstrate a rational factual basis for the ultimate decision." Linam v. King,
804 P.2d 1235, 1239 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
On the other hand, if the finding is considered alone, and not incorporated
together with the findings and conclusions from the custody evaluation reports, it
cannot, as a matter of law support the conclusion that sole custody of the parties'
child should be awarded to petitioner. The trial court is required to consider and
make findings regarding, inter alia, "the past conduct and demonstrated moral
standards of each of the parties" and "which parent is most likely to act in the best
interest of the child, including allowing the child frequent and continuing contact
with the noncustodial parent." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10 (1) (2005); Sukin v.
Sukin, 842 P.2d 922, 924 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). The trial court did not make these
required findings, even though both evaluators' reports expressed concern with
petitioner's inability to place the child's interests above her own need to limit the
child's contact with respondent.

3

Nor is the trial court's emphasis on "consistency of caregiving" - to the
exclusion of all other factors - legally justified. This court has stated: "[T]he role
of primary caretaker . . . must be put into appropriate context." Linam v. King,
804 P.2d 1235 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). The trial court failed to do so here,
essentially failing to make any other findings relevant to the sole custody
determination. Simply identifying one party as the child's primary caregiver
during the interim period preceding trial and concluding that consistency of
caregiving should dictate permanent custody is insufficient as a matter of law to
support a custody award.
In this case, instead of being given dispositive weight, petitioner's alleged
role as primary caregiver during the marriage should have been accorded
particularly little weight. That is because, in this case, (1) the parties separated
when the child was only seven months of age, and thus neither party had
established a lengthy period of primary caregiving of the child during the effective
term of the marriage; (2) the evidence before the trial court was sparse and
conflicting as to respondent's role in the child's life during the seven-month
effective term of the parties' marriage, compare Affidavit of Kristyna Diane Rose,
R.59,ffif4-10 with Respondent's Response to Petitioner's Motion for Temporary
Relief, R.74, f 2; (3) respondent was relegated to a limited role in the child's life
after the parties' separation by petitioner's active interference and the proffer4

based temporary custody order that allowed him only statutorily minimum parenttime with the child, thus precluding him from taking on a primary caretaking role;
and (4) the trial court made no finding regarding the child's level of adjustment in
petitioner's care, and there was evidence before the court that the child should be
assessed for failure to thrive (R.652, at 10, f 5.F.).
Under these circumstances, the trial court's findings are inadaequate
because they accord too much weight to the factor of consistency of caregiving
with petitioner, and too little weight to other pertinent and statutorily mandated
factors, in determining the child's best interests.
Finally, Finding of Fact 16.a. is legally inadequate because it evidences
impermissible bias against parents who work full-time to support their children,
rewarding petitioner for failing to work full-time to support herself and her child
and punishing respondent for doing so.
The foregoing inadequacies in the trial court's findings in support of its
custody award are legal in nature. Respondent does not argue that the findings are
not supported by the evidence, but rather that the findings as a whole, if
incorporated with the custody evaluator's findings and conclusions, are internally
inconsistent and do not support the trial court's award of sole custody to
petitioner. Or, if Finding of Fact 16.a. is taken alone as the trial court's only

5

finding pertaining to sole custody, that this finding is inadequate as a matter of law
to support the trial court's award of sole custody to petitioner.
Because the trial court's findings supporting its custody award are legally
inadequate, respondent is not required in this appeal to marshall the evidence in
support of the findings, and petitioner's argument that the appeal fails for lack of
marshaling is inapposite.
B.

Findings Pertaining to Alimony

Petitioner also argues that respondent has failed to marshall the evidence
pertaining to the court's alimony award, specifically, evidence supporting the trial
court's Finding of Fact 19.a., in which the court declined to impute income to
petitioner.
Respondent's argument regarding Finding of Fact 19.a. is two-fold.
Respondent argues, first, that that portion of the finding that states that "[n]o
persuasive evidence was presented to the Court that the Petitioner is
underemployed" is clearly erroneous and against the uncontroverted evidence.
Secondly, respondent argues that that portion of the finding wherein the court
declines to impute full-time income to petitioner "in light of the fact that Petitioner
has cared for and will continue to care for the two (2) year old minor child in her
home" is legally inadequate.

6

Again, as to the legal inadequacy argument, respondent is not required to
marshall the evidence. See Barnes v. Barnes, 857 P.2d 257, 259 (Utah Ct. App.
1993); Williamson v. Williamson, 1999 UT App 219, n.2, 983 P.2d 1103, n.2.
Petitioner's argument that the argument fails because respondent has not
marshaled the evidence is therefore misplaced.
With respect to the evidentiary argument, respondent submits that he has
adequately marshaled the evidence pertaining to the court's finding that "no
persuasive evidence was presented to the Court that the Petitioner is
underemployed." As set forth in respondent's opening brief, the evidence
regarding petitioner's employment consists entirely of petitioner's own testimony
and is uncontroverted. Petitioner attempts to introduce some controversy into the
evidence by citing to the record in which she testifies about her "Coloboma".
Petitioner's testimony regarding Coloboma - which does not conflict with her
clear and unequivocal testimony that she does not have a disability that would
prevent her from working full-time, see R.646, at 20:16-18 - does not support the
trial court's finding that petitioner is not underemployed.
Petitioner testified that it is hard for her to drive from South Salt Lake to
North Salt Lake, and that she is comfortable driving between nine and four
o'clock. See R.646, at 23-24. She clarifies: "I have lived with [Coloboma] my
whole life, I don't consider it a disability." Id. at 23:20-21. This testimony does
7

not conflict with petitioner's testimony that she "[d]o[es] [not] have a disability
that would prevent [her] from working full time now." Id. at 20:16-18.
In short, respondent has marshaled the evidence directly pertinent to
whether petitioner is underemployed. The evidence is uncontroverted, is based
entirely on petitioner's own testimony, and establishes that petitioner historically
worked full-time, that she is capable of working full-time, and that she has instead
chosen to work part-time. The trial court's finding, directly contrary to this
evidence, that "[n]o persuasive evidence was presented to the Court that the
Petitioner is underemployed" is therefore clearly erroneous.
Petitioner's argument that respondent has not met his marshaling burden
should fail.
II.

RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENTS WERE PRESERVED BELOW
Petitioner next contends that a[n]one of the arguments presented in Mr.

Rose's brief that he now relies upon to attack the award of sole custody to Mrs.
Rose were presented to the trial court, either at the trial itself, or in post decree
proceedings readily available to him." Brief of Appellee, at 20, f 3.
This contention is factually inaccurate. Respondent's argument attacking
the award of sole custody to petitioner pertains solely to the legal insufficiency of
the trial court's findings supporting the award. Respondent initially brought the
legal insufficiency of the trial court's findings to the trial court's attention in his
8

Objection to Proposed Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law and Proposed
Decree of Divorce, filed in the trial court February 24, 2005. See R.490. The
Objection sets forth respondent's precise arguments regarding the insufficiency of
the trial court's findings of fact made in this appeal. The trial court was thus given
an opportunity to correct its error, but declined to do so. Respondent is not
precluded from raising this argument on appeal. Cf. In re K.H., 2004 UT App
483, Tj 10-11, 105 P.3d 967.
As to petitioner's contention that respondent did not have a petition before
the Court seeking joint custody, this is correct, but irrelevant. Respondent's
petition requested that he be awarded sole custody, not joint custody, and
respondent does not appeal the trial court's failure to award joint custody to the
parties. Instead, he appeals the award of sole custody to petitioner, which is not
supported by the trial court's findings.
Petitioner also contends that respondent's arguments regarding imputation
of income to petitioner were not presented to the trial court. Again, petitioner's
contention is factually inaccurate. In closing argument, counsel for respondent
stated: "Child support should be in accordance with the guidelines, however,
income should be computed at full time. I believe Mrs. Rose indicated that she
earns $8.17. She indicated that she's not disabled, she indicated that she, as far as
working, and that she had worked full time in the past, that she worked in medical
9

offices and apparently has an expertise there. There is no reason why she cannot
work full time and to help to provide for her own needs. Child support should, as
well as the needs of the child, child support should be in accordance with the
guidelines based on full time employment of both parties" (R.646, 44:21-45:8).
Clearly, the argument that income should be imputed to petitioner was made
to the trial court and was properly preserved for appeal.
III.

THE UNCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES THAT
PETITIONER IS VOLUNTARILY UNDEREMPLOYED
Petitioner next argues that the trial court did not have sufficient evidence

before it to impute income to petitioner. Petitioner cites Betteridge v. Betteridge,
2004 UT App 50, for this proposition. Betteridge, in turn, quotes Willey v.
Willey, 866 P.2d 547 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), which states that imputation of
income "cannot be premised upon mere conjecture; instead, it demands a careful
and precise assessment requiring detailed findings." Wiley, 866 P.2d at 554.
Petitioner's argument fails for two reasons. First, imputation of income is a
two-pronged analysis, the threshold inquiry being whether a situation of voluntary
underemployment exists. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5(7)(a) (2005); Hill v.
Hill 869 P.2d 963 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Only if the trial court determines that
there is voluntary underemployment does it reach the second prong of the analysis,
namely, determining the amount of income to be imputed.

10

In this case, the trial court did not reach the second prong of the imputation
analysis at all, and thus the Willey and Betteridge mandate - which is addressed to
determination of income, not voluntary underemployment - is inapplicable.
Instead, the trial court simply found that petitioner was not underemployed,
despite her testimony that she works only 12 hours a week (R.646, at 8:17-22),
that she worked full-time during the parties' marriage, and that she is capable of
continued full-time work (R.646 at 20:11-18).
The court grounded its determination of voluntary underemployment not on
the question of whether petitioner was able to work full-time, but on "the fact that
the Petitioner has cared for and will continue to care for the two (2) year old minor
child in her home" (R.580, f 19). Thus, the court implicitly concluded that a
custodial parent of a young child may choose not to work full-time to support
herself or her child, shifting the burden of support to the other parent or spouse.
Respondent assails this conclusion as contrary to the dictates of Sections
78-45-3 and -4 of the Utah Code. These statutory provisions mandate that every
man and every woman shall support his or her child, who shall be presumed to be
in need of the support of its mother and father, and that every man and every
woman shall support his or her spouse when in need.
Thus petitioner's argument fails for the primary reason that petitioner has
misapprehended respondent's argument. Respondent does not appeal the issue of
11

the amount of income imputed to petitioner - this issue not having been reached
by the trial court - but rather the court's threshold finding that petitioner is not
underemployed. The evidentiary grounds referenced in Willey for determining an
appropriate imputed income are not germane to this finding.
Petitioner's argument fails for the additional reason that, insofar as
respondent requests that income be imputed to petitioner consistent with her
current hourly wage projected to full-time employment, Willey itself supports
such an approach. In Willey, this court held that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion "in setting Mrs. Willey's earnings at $860 per month based on a
projection of full-time work at her present salary." Willev v Willev, 866 P.2d 547,
553 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). The court held only that there was no evidentiary basis
for the trial court's additional finding that Mrs. Willey could earn substantially
more than that amount within a year or two. Id. at 553-54.
Respondent has made no such argument and has not advocated that
petitioner's income should be imputed at any level other than her current wageearning capacity projected to full-time employment. The amount is grounded in
the evidence and is not "mere conjecture". Petitioner's argument to the contrary
should be disregarded.

12

IV.

PETITIONER, NOT RESPONDENT, HAS THE BURDEN TO
ESTABLISH THAT PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF
ALIMONY
Finally, petitioner argues that it was somehow respondent's burden to have

presented evidence to the trial court sufficient to allow the trial court to make the
findings necessary to support an award of alimony to petitioner. Petitioner thus
implicitly acknowledges that the trial court's findings cannot support its alimony
award.
More importantly, petitioner errs in her assumption that it is respondent's
burden to prove petitioner's entitlement to alimony. Clearly, petitioner, as the
party who purportedly requested alimony - though in fact at trial petitioner
requested alimony only if respondent did not pay the parties' marital debt - must
establish that she is entitled to receive it. See Willey v. Willey, 951 P.2d 226, 231
(Utah 1997). Petitioner's failure to do so may not be swept aside by the trial court
and alimony awarded anyway based on purely speculative and contradictory
findings regarding petitioner's need and respondent's ability to pay.
Petitioner did not make a proper request for alimony at trial and did not
adduce evidence sufficient to establish entitlement to it. The trial court's failure to
support its alimony award with adequate findings results from petitioner's failure,
not respondent's. This court should not countenance petitioner's attempt to shift
the burden of proof and should vacate the trial court's alimony award to petitioner.
13

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, and as set forth in respondent's opening brief,
this court should reverse the trial court's award of sole physical custody to
petitioner, should set aside the trial court's finding that income should not be
imputed to petitioner, directing the trial court on remand to impute income to
petitioner in an amount consistent with full-time employment at her current hourly
wage, and should vacate the trial court's award of alimony to petitioner.
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